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AND THE BAN PLAYS ON ... FOR NOW:

WHY COURTS MUST CONSIDER RELIGION IN MARRIAGE
EQUALITY CASES
MATTHEW

E.

FEINBERG,

EsQ.*

"[These states], in righteous indignation, have blocked
the possibility of two people affirming and legalizing
their love for each other. There will come a time when
we will look back upon these actions for the shame it
is."
I. INTRODUCTION

The gay marriage ban is one of the most controversial issues in
politics, in society, in religion, and in law today.2 It is debated in
political forums and considered in legislative chambers; it is discussed
over the morning paper and argued about on the car ride home from
work; it is preached about in Sunday sermons and mentioned at church
picnics; it is scrutinized in countless law school classrooms across the
country and analyzed in just as many courtrooms. In each venue,
anything goes, everyone has an opinion, and the result is rarely
consistent. Over and over again, same-sex marriage bans with the
same or similar language have been litigated in the states' highest
courts, and over and over again, those courts have either upheld the
statutes that ban same-sex marriage or overturned them just as easily.3
The decisions may be different, but the claimants' arguments are

Copyright © 2011 by Matthew E. Feinberg.
* LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law;
B.S.Ed., University of Virginia. Mr. Feinberg is an attorney in private practice in Washington,
D.C.
1. Reverend F. Russell Baker, United Church of Christ, Benton Harbor, Michigan
(Mar. 29, 2005) available at http://www.buddybuddy.com/quotes-2.html (last visited Dec. 16,
2010).
2. Louis Thorson, Comment, Same-Sex Divorce and Wisconsin Courts: Imperfect
Harmony,92 MARQ. L. REV. 617 (2009).

3. Compare Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003)
(holding that a ban on same-sex marriages violates the equal protection clause of the
Massachusetts Constitution) with Dean v. Conaway, 932 A.2d 571, 635 (Md. 2007) (holding
that a ban on same-sex marriages does not violate the equal protection clause of the Maryland
Constitution Declaration of Rights, despite its overt similarities with the Massachusetts
constitutional provisions).
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usually the same-banning same-sex marriage denies same-sex couples
equal protection under the law. 4
Surprisingly, one exceedingly relevant issue to the same-sex
marriage debate is almost never considered: religion. It is the pink
elephant in the marriage equality courtroom, yet it is extremely rare for
same-sex marriage bans to receive a First Amendment religious rightsbased inquiry.5 In 2009, the Supreme Court of Iowa changed all that.
In Varnum v. Brien,6 Iowa's highest court attacked the issue of
religious freedom.7 In holding Iowa's same-sex marriage ban
unconstitutional, the Court stated that religious opposition to same-sex
marriage cannot be used to justify a same-sex marriage ban. The Iowa
court was the first court in seventeen years to consider the issue, 9 and
the decision to do so will likely have lasting effects on the same-sex
marriage debate. By considering religion's place in the same-sex
marriage debate, the court opened the door for future courts to
consider the reverse: is religious opposition to same-sex marriage
sufficient to overturn a same-sex marriage ban under the establishment
clause of the First Amendment? This article explores that very issue.
Because the debate over same-sex marriage would not exist
without the revolution that came before it, this article will first
examine the history of gay rights and same-sex marriage in America.lo
It will focus primarily on the marriage equality decisions of
Massachusetts" and lowal2-two states at the heart of the same-sex
marriage debate. While this oft-argued issue is fodder for varied
constitutional analyses, this article will focus solely on the issue of
religious liberty and same-sex marriage.' 3 It will outline the legal

4. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 953 (citing plaintiffs' argument that same-sex
marriage ban violated plaintiffs' equal protection rights); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d 384, 400 (2008) (commenting that the issues plaintiffs raised harkens to equal protection
principles).
5. Ben Schuman, Note, Gods & Gays: Analyzing the Same-Sex MarriageDebate From
a Religious Perspective, 96 Geo. L.J. 2103, 2113 (2008). Early court decisions addressed the
interaction of religion and same-sex marriage, but as opponents of same-sex marriage realized
the dangers inherent in religious arguments, they abandoned those claims for secular
arguments in support of same-sex marriage bans. Id.
6. 763 N.w.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
7. Id. at 904.
8. Id.
9. See Dean v. District of Columbia, No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364 (D.C. Super. Ct.,
1992), aff'd 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
10. SeeinfraPartll.
11. Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
12. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
13. See infra Part IV.
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history of the First Amendment establishment clausel 4 and its
relevance to today's marriage equality argument.' 5 This article will
then analyze the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans under the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.' 6
This article seeks change. The time has come for courts to
consider religion, to stop ignoring relevant constitutional principles
simply because it is the popular religion that is supported through
legislation, to recognize the impact of particular religious thought on
the rights of all Americans, and to remedy the latent religious
undertones of the same-sex marriage debate. The time has come for
America's courts to walk us down the aisle towards equality for all
people.
II. THE COURTSHIP PERIOD: THE HISTORY OF GAY RIGHTS
AND THE FIGHT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY
"Everyone's restless, angry and high-spirited. No one has a
slogan, no one even has an attitude, but something's brewing."l7 In the
streets of Greenwich Village, in the early morning hours of June 28,
1969, the restlessness, anger, and high-spiritedness that once
smoldered among the crowd outside the Stonewall Inn began to bum
hotter, and in the blink of an eye, ignited the gay rights movement.' 8
Prior to the Stonewall riots, America, as a whole, was generally antigay: in 1961, all but one state' 9 criminalized consensual homosexual
sexual conduct, 20 late-night raids on gay bars and arrests of their
patrons were common21 and homosexuality was considered a mental
22
illness. Gays and lesbians were unwilling to fight for rights in court,
anticipating the almost assured legal loss and the scrutiny they would

14. See infra Part III.

15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. DAVID CARTER, STONEWALL: THE RIOTS THAT SPARKED THE GAY REVOLUTION 148

(2004).
18. See Andrew M. Jacobs, The Rhetorical Construction of Rights: The Case of the Gay
Rights Movement, 1969-1991, 72 NEB. L. REv. 723, 725 (1993).
19. CARTER, supra note 17, at 15. The only state not to criminalize homosexual sex was
Illinois. Id. at 1.

20. Id. at 15.
21. Id.at79-83.
22. The American Psychiatric Association categorized homosexuality as a mental illness
until 1973. See generally RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE
POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS (1987) (describing history of controversy relating to declassification of
homosexuality and its deletion from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III).
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face from a judgmental public. 2 3 The Stonewall riots changed all
that.2 4 In the wake of Stonewall, numerous national and local gay
rights organizations formed. 25 The gay community "showed an
increasing willingness... to assert legal claims challenging
discrimination based on sexual orientation" and the American public
began to show signs of acceptance.2 6 Shortly after Stonewall, a
Minnesota gay couple even filed a mandamus proceeding to obtain a
marriage license, an act that constitutes the first attempt to legalize
same-sex marriage through the court system.27 Still, the gay rights
movement was fighting an uphill battle. The law in almost every state
remained anti-gay, and it would be years of continued discrimination,
even from the nation's highest court, before any of that would
change. 28
23. Rhonda R. Rivera, Where are we? Anti-Gay-Lesbian-Bisexual Ballot Attacks Today,
55 OHIo ST. L. J. 555, 557 (1994).
24. "Something unremarkable happened on June 27, 1969 in New York's Greenwich
Village.... The police raided a gay bar." Lionel Wright, The Stonewall Riots-19 -A Turning
Point in the Struggle for Gay and Lesbian Liberation, SOCIALISM TODAY, (July 1, 1999),
available at http://socialistaltemative.org/literature/stonewall.html (last visited August 31,
2010); see also MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL (Penguin, 1993). Although the raid began as

nothing more than what had become commonplace at gay establishments in and around New
York City in the 1960s, what happened as a result of that raid was anything but typical. See
Wright, supra note 24. "Was it a 'butch' lesbian dressed in man's clothes who resisted arrest, or
a male drag queen who stopped in the doorway between the officers and posed defiantly,
rallying the crowd? .. . [T]here was no one thing that happened or one person, there was just .
. . a flash of group, of mass anger." Id.
Some in the crowd threw coins; others threw rocks and bottles; they chanted "Gay Power!" at
the tops of their lungs. Id. "As word spread through Greenwich Village and across the city,
hundreds of gay men and lesbians, black, white, Hispanic, and predominantly working class,
converged on the Christopher Street area around the Stonewall Inn to join the fray." Id.
Although the police responded with force to break up the crowd, the protestors fought on. Id.
"The [police] would disperse the jeering mob only to have it re-form behind them, yelling
taunts, tossing bottles and bricks, setting fires in trash cans. . . . [The police soon] found
themselves face-to-face with their worst nightmare: a chorus line of mocking queens, their
arms clasped around each other, kicking their heels in the air Rockettes-style and singing at
the tops of their sardonic voices . . . ." Id. For the next four nights, thousands of protestors
filled the streets, unified against the city's ill-treatment of gays and lesbians. Id. At the
beckoned call of drag queens and so-called social deviants, the gay rights movement had
begun. Id.
25. Patricia A. Cain, Litigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1551, 1581 (1993).

26. Carlos A. Ball, The Blurringof the Lines: Children and Bans on InterracialUnions
and Same-Sex Marriages,76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2751 (2008).

27. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). In Baker, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota ruled that same-sex couples were not entitled to marriage, and that such a
restriction was not unconstitutional under the First, Eighth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. Id. at 187.
28. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) (holding that the
United States Constitution does not provide homosexuals with a fundamental right to engage
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A.Bowers v. Hardwick
Seventeen years after Stonewall, in 1986, the United States
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Bowers v. Hardwick2 9 a
landmark case that man expected to be a major turning point in the
gay rights movement. In Bowers, Michael Hardwick, who was
charged with the crime of committing a consensual homosexual sex
act in his own home, challenged the constitutionality of Georgia's
criminal sodomy statute. 3 1 Hardwick argued that, as "a practicing
homosexual ... the Georgia sodomy statute, as administered ...
placed him in imminent danger of arrest, and that the statute for
several reasons violate[d] the Federal Constitution." 32 Hardwick
argued that he had a constitutional right to privacy and that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected his behavior. 33 In a 5-4 decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court held, among other things, that "[t]he [U.S.]
Constitution does not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy." 34 It was a severe blow to the gay rights movement,
the residual effects of which would linger for years to come, as some
legislatures and courts used the Bowers decision to perpetuate
discrimination against gays and lesbians. 35
Despite the disappointing Bowers decision, and the resulting
defense of sexual orientation discrimination in the years that followed,
several states repealed their criminal sodomy statutes. 36 Although
American society seemed to acknowledge the flaws of the Bowers

in consensual sodomy) with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that
homosexuals have a right to privacy such that their private consensual sexual conduct cannot
be made a crime).
29. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
30. Neil Devins & Alan Meese, Judicial Review and Nongeneralizable Cases, 32 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 323, 329 (2005). The ACLU, which represented Mr. Hardwick, had long
desired to challenge the constitutionality of sodomy statutes. After waiting five years, Bowers
presented itself "as an all-but-perfect case." DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 656 (1994).

31. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). At the time, Georgia law stated that "[a]
person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. . ." GA. CODE ANN. §
16-6-2 (1984). Violation of the statute was punishable by incarceration for a period of between
one and twenty years. Id.
32. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188.
33. Id. at 190.
34. Id. at 186.
35. Hollis V. Pfitsch, Homosexuality in Asylum and Constitutional Law: Rhetoric of
Acts and Identity, 15 LAW & SEXUALITY 59, 59-60 (2006).

36. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
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decision, the gay and lesbian community remained saddled with an
unfavorable legal landscape. 37
B. Lawrence v. Texas
It took seventeen years for the U.S. Supreme Court to consider
gay rights after the Stonewall riots, and the Court got it wrong.3 8 It
took seventeen more for the Court to get it right. In 2003, the U.S.
Supreme Court revisited gay rights issues in Lawrence v. Texas.3 9 At
the time, Texas law provided that "[a] person commits [a criminal]
offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
individual of the same sex." 40 "Deviate sexual intercourse" consisted
of oral or anal sexual contact, even when it occurred between
consenting adults. 4 1 The defendants, charged under the Texas statute
after a police officer responding to a bogus "weapons disturbance" call
caught them mid-coitus, challenged the constitutionality of the
statute.42 The Court determined that individuals "are entitled to respect
for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or
",43
control their destiny by makinp their private sexual conduct a crime.
Lawrence overruled Bowers, gave the gay rights movement a muchneeded boost, 45 and blew the winds of change towards a new goal:
marriage equality for same-sex couples.
C. The Modern Concept of Marriage
[M]odern marriage is embedded in its historic tradition
as a religious institution. Even today, marriage has not
37. Pfitsch, supra note 35, at 59-60.
38. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189-90 (1986) (holding that the
United States Constitution does not provide homosexuals with a fundamental right to engage
in consensual sodomy) with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (2003) (holding that homosexuals have
a right to privacy such that their private consensual sexual conduct cannot be made a crime).
39. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
40. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 21.06(a)

(2003).

41. Id. at§21.01(1).
42. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-63 (2003).
43. Id. at 578.
44. Id. Justice Anthony Kennedy, delivering the opinion of a 6-3 majority of the Court
stated that "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought
not to remain binding precedent." Id.
45. "Lawrence was thought to be a sweeping victory; it opened up doors in the gay
movement and granted a number of rights, all which seemed unattainable under the previous .
. . regime." Shulamit H. Shvartsman, "Romeo and Romeo": An Examination of Limon v.
Kansas in Light ofLawrence v. Texas, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 359, 400 (2004).
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fully emerged as a secular legal status. Vestiges of the
religious origins of marriage continue to shape attitudes
and inform the views of many marriage defenders, and
cause concern for those who are committed to secular
legal institutions.4 6
While the forefathers of the American Constitution sought a
strict separation between church and state, 47 marriage has always been,
and will likely always be, an issue that cannot be so easily categorized.
It logically follows that the religious rights embodied in the American
Constitution must be a part of the conversation about same-sex
marriage. However, parties and courts have been reluctant to approach
the equal marriage issue from a religious perspective, deciding instead
to resolve the issue on other constitutional grounds.4 8
D. Goodridge v. DepartmentofPublic Health
Following the filing of the first same-sex marriage case in
1971, several other same-sex couples in various states filed lawsuits in
attempts to obtain marriage status, but on each occasion, they were
denied relief.4 9 It had taken seventeen years for gay rights advocates to
turn a Bowers50 defeat into a Lawrence5 ' victory in the fight for the

46. Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without Marriage,41 FAM. L.Q. 537, 538 (2007).
47. Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1879-80 (2009).
48. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (denying
marriage equality as not required by equal protection principles); Adams v. Howerton, 673
F.2d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the denial of a same-sex marriage license to a
gay couple met rational basis review under the due process and equal protection clauses);
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (denying same-sex marriage despite right to
privacy, due process and equal protection arguments); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d
307, 318-20 (D.C. 1995) (denying same-sex couples the right to marry despite an additional
Human Rights Act claim), but see Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009)
(dismissing religious rights as a justification for denying same-sex marriage rights).
49. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589-90 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973)
(determining that same-sex marriage, by definition, was impossible); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d
1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (denying marriage equality as not required by equal
protection principles); Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
the denial of a same-sex marriage license to a gay couple met rational basis review); Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (1993) (denying same-sex marriage despite right to privacy, due
process and equal protection arguments); Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 318-20
(D.C. 1995) (denying same-sex couples the right to marry despite an additional Human Rights
Act claim).
50. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
51. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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right to privacy.52 A mere five months later, gay rights advocates
achieved their biggest victory yet.53
In Goodridge v. Dep't of PublicHealth,54 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts addressed the right of same-sex couples to
The Court utilized equal
marry within the Commonwealth.
protection and due process analyses in rendering its decision.5 6 Citing
the many rights afforded only to married couples, the Court, in a
controversial ruling that received national scrutiny, determined that
Massachusetts could no longer "deny the protections, benefits, and
obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same
sex who wish to marry... The Massachusetts Constitution ... forbids
the creation of second-class citizens."5 In a few short months, the gay
rights movement had advanced farther and faster than advocates could
have anticipated, but the decision came at a heavy cost to the gay and
lesbian community.
The backlash from Goodridge resonated throughout the
country, as eleven states enacted le islation banning same-sex
marriage within the next twelve months. In the five years following
the Goodridge decision, the number of states officially rejecting samesex marriage grew; by the close of the 2008 election, forty-four states
specifically banned same-sex marriage.59 Perhaps the most painful of
those state bans was enacted in California in 2008. Proposition 8, a
voter initiative that banned same-sex marriages in the state, passed a
short five months after the California Supreme Court ruled that samesex couples could marry there. 60 The passage of Pro osition 8 initially
proved to be a major setback in the gay community.
52. Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195 (1986) (holding that the United States
Constitution does not provide homosexuals with a fundamental right to engage in consensual
sodomy) with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (2003) (holding that homosexuals have a right to
privacy such that their private consensual sexual conduct cannot be made a crime).
53. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003).
54. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
55. Id. at 948-50.
56. Id. at 953.
57. Id. at 948.
58. Joel Roberts, II States Ban Same-Sex Marriage, CBS NEWS (Nov. 2, 2004),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/30/politics/main646662.shtml.
59.

See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE MARRIAGE PROHIBITIONS (Nov. 17,

2008), http://www.hrc.org/documents/marriageprohibitions.pdf.
60. Id; see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008).
61. Following the passage of Proposition 8, a lawsuit was filed in federal court in
California to overturn the voter initiative. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 78817, *11 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 4, 2010). The case proceeded to a highly-publicized
bench trial, and on August 4, 2010, Chief Judge Vaughn Walker of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California issued an opinion ruling that Proposition 8 was
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Despite the disappointing Proposition 8 vote, in late 2008 and
early 2009, the tide swung again, this time in favor of marriage
equality. Between October 2008 and March 2010, five states and the
District of Columbia joined Massachusetts and added their names to
the same-sex marriage registry: Connecticut 62 and Iowa63 by judicial
decree; Maine, 64 Vermont,"6 the District of Columbia66 and New
Hampshire 67 through legislative action. While the decision of the
Supreme Court of Connecticut generally mirrored the Goodridge68
decision, the Supreme Court of Iowa went one step further and entered
unchartered territory. 69
E. Varnum v. Brien
In Varnum v. Brien,70 for the first time ever, a state high court
considered religion as it affects same-sex marriage.7 1 Although the
issue was not brought before the court at oral argument,7 2 the Iowa
court, sua sponte, addressed the issue directly. 73 After considering that
various religions and religious sects treat the concept of same-sex
marriage differently, the court stated that "in pursuing our task ... we
unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States
Constitution. Id. at *191-93, 216-17 (ruling that Proposition 8 violated the due process clause
because it impacted the fundamental right of marriage and proponents of the law failed to
present evidence that the amendment was narrowly tailored to a compelling government
interest and that it violated the equal protection clause because Proposition 8 "disadvantages
gays and lesbians without any rational justification").
62. See Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008).
63. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009).
64. See Jenna Russell & Eric Moskowitz, Maine governor OK's gay marriage, BOSTON
GLOBE, (May 7, 2009). In November 2009, a Maine voter initiative overturned the State's
same-sex marriage law. Devin Dwyer, Maine Gay MarriageLaw Repealed, ABC NEWS (Nov.
at
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/maine-gay-marriage-lawavailable
4,
2009),
repealed/story?id=8992720.
65. See Abby Goodnough, Rejecting Veto, Vermont Backs Gay Marriage,N.Y. TIMES,
April 8, 2009, at Al.
66. See Same-sex couples in D.C. Say 'I do', CNN, (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-03-09/politics/same.sex.marriages_1 same-sex-couplesmarriage-equality-supreme-court? s=PM:POLITICS (last visited August 31, 2010).
67. See Eric Moskowitz, N.H. ties gay-marriageknot, BOSTON GLOBE, June 4, 2009, at
I.
68. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
69. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 905-06 (Iowa 2009) (discussing religious
views on same-sex marriage and ruling that such views cannot impact the constitutional
consideration of same-sex marriage).
70. 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
71. Id. at 904-06.
72. Id. at 904.
73. Id. at 905.
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proceed as civil judges, far removed from the theological debate ...
and focus only on the concept of civil marriage and the state licensing
system that identifies a limited class of persons entitled to secular
rights and benefits associated with civil marriage." 74 The Court
dismissed religious rights as a justification for upholding a gay
marriage ban, acknowledging that as religious opinions of same-sex
marriage differ, religious opposition to same-sex marriage cannot be
used to justify a same-sex marriage ban, 75 as acceptance of such a
justification would endorse some religious beliefs over others. With its
decision, the Supreme Court of Iowa changed the landscape of the
same-sex marriage debate and opened the door for "reverse" religious
rights attacks on same-sex marriage bans through the court system.
III. THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE, THE LAW OF RELIGION, AND GAY
MARRIAGE
While Varnum reinforced the idea that equal protection
challenges to same-sex marriage bans can be successful, the opinion
was novel because it was the first one to address religion's role in the
debate. 76 The constitutional protections of religion are found in the
First Amendment, which states that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. . . .,77 In considering religion's interaction with same-sex
marriage, the Supreme Court of Iowa may have laid a path for
plaintiffs to follow in future challenges to same-sex marriage bans. As
the Iowa decision suggests, religious arguments may be a basis for
relief in same-sex marriage cases, which raises the question of whether
the same success could be achieved under the Establishment Clause. 78

74. Id. The decision of the Iowa Supreme Court, although a monumental victory for the
gay rights movement, was not without consequence. In November 2010, three judges who
joined the unanimous decision to overturn the Iowa same-sex marriage were not approved for
retention by Iowa voters, an unprecedented turn of events. Hayley Bruce, Supreme Court
justices involved in gay marriageruling not retained, THE DAILY IOWAN, Nov. 3, 2010, at IA,
available at http://www.dailyiowan.com/2010/11/03/Metro/19821.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2010).
75. Id. at 906.
76. Id. at 904.
77. U.S. CONST. amend I.
78. Id.
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A.Modern Establishment ClauseJurisprudence
This country's modem-day Establishment Clause concepts
began with Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing,79 where the
United States Supreme Court iterated the "wall of separation between
church and state" principle.8 0 In Everson,8 ' the Court was tasked with
determining whether it is "an impermissible establishment of religion
for a state to subsidize transportation for students attending certain
private religious schools, but not all private schools, whether secular or
religious[.]" 82 The Court determined that, under the Establishment
Clause, the government must remain neutral.8 3
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another....
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a
wall of separation between Church and State.

...

[The

purpose of the Amendment is] to create a complete and
permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity
and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding
every form of public. . . support for religion. 84
For the next twenty-five years, Establishment Clause decisions
were fairly consistent85 as the Court tailored its rulings to fit within the
wall of separation created in Everson.86
In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court took the Establishment
Clause a bit further in Board of Education v. Allen. 87 In Allen, the
Court reviewed a New York statute that required "local public school
authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades
seven through [twelve]" including private school students.8 8 The Court
79. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
80. Justin T. Wilson, Preservationism,or the Elephant in the Room: How Opponents of
Same-Sex MarriageDeceive Us Into Establishing Religion, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
561, 604 (2007) (citing Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
81. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
82. Wilson, supra note 80, at 604.
83. 330 U.S. at 15-16.
84. Wilson, supra note 80, at 604-05.
85. Note, Church, Choice, and Charters: A New Wrinkle for Public Education?, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1750, 1758 (2009) [hereinafter "Church, Choice, and Charters"].
86. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
87. 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
88. Id. at 238.
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was called on to consider, in part, whether the statute was "a law
respecting the establishment of religion." 89 In ruling that the statute
was constitutional under the First Amendment, the Court reiterated a
test developed through prior case law called the "purpose and primary
effect" test.90 Under that test, "if either [the purpose or primary effect
of the statute] is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by
the Constitution." 91 The purpose and primary effect test made the
Establishment Clause analysis a bit clearer, offering a guide for
constitutional analysis. However, in 1971, the Court issued an
opinion 9 2 that made the Establishment Clause analysis a bit murky. 93
B. Lemon v. Kurtzman
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,94 the United States Supreme Court
considered Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes that provided
government funding to church-related private schools. 95 Under its
statute, the Pennsylvania government created subsidies for religious
schools to reimburse them for teachers' salaries, textbooks and
educational materials. 96 Rhode Island's statute provided for payments
to be made directly to private school teachers to supplement their
salaries. 97 The taxpayers of the two states filed suit seeking to declare
the statutes unconstitutional under the Establishment and Free Exercise
clauses of the First Amendment.9 8 In finding both statutes
unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court combined its prior decisions
to create what became known as the Lemon test,99 a three-pronged test
89. Id.
90. Id. at 243. The Court looked to its previous decisions in Everson, 330 U.S. at 16
(1947), Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952), McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
461 (1961), and Abington Twp. School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) which
originally fashioned the purpose and primary effect test.
91. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
92. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
93. David Felsen, Comment, Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause
Analysis: Consistency for the Future, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 395, 413 (1989) (arguing that the
multiple tests that have developed, beginning with the Lemon decision create a difficult
analysis for courts today).
94. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
95. Id. at 606-07.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 607.
98. Id. at 608.
99. The Court pulled three concepts from two prior Establishment Clause cases to create
the Lemon test. See Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (requiring statutes that
impact religion to have a secular purpose and to not have the effect of advancing or inhibiting
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for Establishment Clause analysis.100 The Lemon test, which
essentially added a third prong to the purpose and primary effect test
developed through history and reiterated in Allen,' 0 dictates that a
statute will be ruled unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause
unless: (a) the statute has a secular legislative purpose; (b) the statute
does not have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting
religion; and (c) the statute does not result in an "excessive
government entanglement" with religion.' 02
In the years following the announcement of the Lemon test, the
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court followed the test closely, but as
Establishment Clause cases became more complicated, so too did the
test used to evaluate them. 0 3 At various times throughout recent
history, the Justices of the Supreme Court have shown a general
dissatisfaction with the Lemon test as a whole, at least "as a
comprehensive test for all [E]stablishment [Clause] cases." 104 The
Lemon test, however, has never been expressly discarded, and "a
majority of [J]ustices [continue] to suppose that either a purpose to
promote religion or a direct effect of advancing religion may render a
program unconstitutional."' 0 5 The Court now uses the Lemon test
sporadically as it developed and used other tests in more recent
Establishment Clause cases.106
C. Other Establishment Clause Tests
In Establishment Clause analyses, the Court occasionally
employs the "historical acknowledgment test" which is rarely, but
effectively used to quash controversial issues that seek to invalidate
religion); Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (ruling
unconstitutional those statutes that foster an "excessive government entanglement with
religion").
100. Lemon, 403 U.S. at612-13.
101. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
102. Id.
103. In Roemer v. Md. Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 751(1976), for example, Justice
Blackmun discussed a potential fourth prong to the Lemon test: divisiveness. The Court also
mentioned a three-part expansion to the entanglement prong. Id. at 755-56. The interweaving
of the various tests apparently began to confuse Supreme Court Justices from time to time. For
instance, Justice White, acknowledged his confusion in his dissent in Roemer, and he called on
the Court to return the test to the simple two-factor test discussed in Abington Twp. Sch. Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) which originally fashioned the purpose and primary effect
test. Id. at 767-69.
104. Church, Choice, and Charters,supranote 85, at 1759.
105. KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLs? 13-22 (Princeton,

2005).
106. Church, Choice, and Charters,supra note 85, at 1759 n.67.
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long-standing religious practices. 107 Justice Warren Burger announced
the test in Marsh v. Chambers,'0 8 stating "if the practice is one that has
been common throughout United States history, it is not a violation of
the [E]stablishment [C]lause."1 09 The historical test offers greater
protections to the religious majority-those individuals who have
conducted themselves in a certain way for so long that the Court
occasionally offers their conduct protection under the law."10
As the Supreme Court continued to wrestle with its
Establishment Clause decisions, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
suggested what has become known as the "endorsement test" in a
concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly."' The endorsement test
states that "if a reasonable observer would find a particular practice to
be an endorsement of religion, that practice violates the Establishment
Clause."ll 2 The test generally offers greater protections to religious
minorities and non-believers than the other tests, as it removes the
concept of practical history from the equation.1 3 The endorsement test
is rarely used today. It was criticized shortly after it was announced
and described as "unworkable,"' 1 4 and it is unlikely that the
endorsement test will see increased use in the future now that its
author has retired from the U.S. Supreme Court."'
The coercion test is the most recent of the four Establishment
Clause tests developed by the U.S. Supreme Court.11 6 The coercion
test, announced by Justice Anthony Kennedy in County ofAlleghany v.
ACLU,'" 7 states that the "government may not coerce anyone to
107. Wilson, supra note 80, at 611-12.
108. 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983). In Marsh, the Court determined that the principles
discussed in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), should not be applied to the
Nebraska Legislature's practice of beginning each session with a prayer led by a chaplain paid
from the State coffers with the legislature's approval. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784, 795. The Court
reasoned that "[t]he unbroken practice [of beginning legislative sessions with a prayer] for two
centuries in the National Congress and for more than a century in Nebraska and in many other
states gives abundant assurance that there is no real threat" of an Establishment Clause
violation. Id. at 795 (quoting Panhandle Oil Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
109. Schuman, supra note 5, at 2131.
110. Id.at2131-32.
111. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. Schuman, supra note 5, at 2132 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
113. Id. at 2132-33.
114. Id.at2133.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 492 U.S. 573, 660-61 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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support or participate in any religion or its exercise."' 18 The coercion
test offers what Justice Kennedy believes to be a basic rule that helps
clarify Establishment Clause jurisprudence.' 19 Rather than make
Establishment Clause analyses easier, the existence of four tests
muddies the already cloudy waters even more.120
D. The Law of the Land
Today, the Lemon test remains the most consistently applied
test for Establishment Clause cases.12 1 The Supreme Court applied it
recently in McCreary County v. ACLU,1 22 a 2005 case holding that
religiously-themed displays on government-owned land violate the
Establishment Clause. The Court, however, has abandoned one or
more prongs of the Lemon test when it deems appropriate, as it did in
Van Orden v. Perryl23 and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.124 Despite the
Court's wavering use of the Lemon test, foundationally, all
Establishment Clause cases will receive Lemon review; it remains the

law of the land.125

118. Mark Strasser, The Coercion Test: On Prayer,Offense, and Doctrinal Inculcation,
53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 417,427 (2009).
119. Schuman, supra note 5, at 2133-34.
120. Id. at 2134.
121. Barry P. McDonald, Getting Beyond Religion as Science: Unstifling Worldview
Formation in American Public Education, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 587, 655 n.3 2 3 (2009).
122. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
123. 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005). In Van Orden, the Court weighed whether a monument of
the Ten Commandments outside the Texas State Capitol violates the Establishment Clause. Id.
at 681. In an opinion drafted by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court stated that
"[w]hatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas
has erected on its Capitol grounds. Instead, our analysis is driven both by the nature of the
monument and by our Nation's history." Id. at 686.
124. 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002). In Zelman, the Court considered an Ohio educational
pilot program that provided tuition aid to students at both public and private schools. Id. at
644-49. In a concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor explained that while the
Lemon test is a "central tool" in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, id. at 668, in
"indirect aid cases" such as Zelman, two factors are considered: "first, whether the program
administers aid in a neutral fashion, without differentiation based on the religious status of
beneficiaries or providers . . .; second, and more importantly, whether beneficiaries of indirect
aid have a genuine choice among religious and nonreligious organizations when determining
the organization to which they will direct that aid." Id. at 669. Only where the answer to either
question is "no" is there an Establishment Clause violation. Id.
125. See generally McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
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E. The EstablishmentClause in Past Same-Sex MarriageCases
The Superior Court of the District of Columbia applied the
Lemon test in deciding its first same-sex marriage case, Dean v.
District of Columbia, 2 in 1992. The D.C. court dismissed an
Establishment Clause argument quickly by stating that "[w]hatever
may be the exact contours of the separation [of Church and State], it is
inconceivable that the 'wall' is so impregnable as to preclude judicial
or legislative resort to the Bible merely as a historical reference. None
of the Lemon proscriptions is implicated in the least by so doing."l 2 7
By additionally citing religious dogma and tradition as a basis for its
decision,' 28 the court ruled that the Establishment Clause did not
render the statute unconstitutional.1 29 It is, to date, the only time an
Establishment Clause claim has been argued in a same-sex marriage
case.130 The new emerging landscape of the same-sex marriage debate
beckons for that issue to be raised once more. It is time for the courts
to revisit religion.
IV. THE MAIN EVENT: WHY SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BANS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS OF RELIGION
While the Supreme Court has recently shown a willingness to
depart from the traditions of the Lemon test for Establishment Clause
decisions,131 the three-pronged test remains the jumping-off-point for
all Establishment Clause analyses.' 3 2 With that in mind, this article
will analyze the same-sex marriage question by following this path. In
order to determine whether same-sex marriage bans meet
constitutional muster, a reviewing court would first consider whether:
(a) the ban on same-sex marriages has a secular legislative purpose;
(b) these bans have the primary effect of enhancing or inhibiting
religion; and (c) the bans result in an excessive government

126. No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364 (Sup. Ct. D.C. 1992).
127. Id. at *5.
128. Id. at *7.
129. Id. at *5.
130. Wilson, supra note 80, at 577.
131. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (holding that the Lemon test
"is not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its
capitol grounds. Instead, our analysis is driven by both the nature of the monument and by our
Nation's history"); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002) (utilizing the
purpose and primary effect test without a total abandonment of the test iterated in Lemon).
132. 403 U.S. 602, 612 13 (1971).
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entanglement with religion. 133 While the Supreme Court of Iowa
considered religion in its landmark same-sex marriage decision,' 34 the
analysis was confined to whether religious opposition to same-sex
marriage justified a ban on same-sex marriages.' 35 This article
considers the reverse: Do same-sex marriage bans have the effect of
establishing religion in violation of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution?
A.There is No SecularPurposefor Banning Same-Sex Marriage
If a statute has a secular legislative purpose, the Establishment
Clause will "not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose
reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions . . . ."136 Such a bright line rule presents
a major hurdle for gay rights claimants. 137 Although marriage equality
advocates can argue that a law restricting marriage to same-sex
couples has an inherent decidedly religious basis, the Court is unlikely
to be receptive to such an argument unless the claimants can
distinguish themselves from the rule.138 In essence, claimants must
prove affirmatively that no secular purpose exists for the statute. That
process can be a complicated one, wrought with historical and
sympathetic arguments from the opposition.13 9 Nevertheless, the
overwhelming evidence applicable to the same-sex marriage debate
shows that a valid secular purpose does not exist for banning same-sex
marriages.140 Accordingly, same-sex marriage bans must be struck
down as a violation of the Establishment Clause.
1.So-Called "Valid" Secular Arguments in Opposition of
Same-Sex Marriages
Same-sex marriage scholars have divided the secular
arguments against same-sex marriage into three categories: the
definitional argument, the stamp-of-approval argument, and the
133. Id.
134. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 905 (Iowa 2009).
135. Id. at 906.
136. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
137. Marc L. Rubinstein, Note, Gay Rights and Religion: A Doctrinal Approach to the
Argument that Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives Violate the Establishment Clause, 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 1585, 1595-96 (1995).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., id. at 1609-13 (presenting anti-gay rights arguments such as traditional
morality and disfavor of "special rights").
140. See infra Parts IVA.
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defense-of-marriage argument.141 Under the definitional argument,
"marriage is a union between a man and a woman because that's the
way it's always been." 4 2 The stamp-of-approval argument states that
"any rights of marriage afforded to same-sex couples will be perceived
as an endorsement of homosexuality." 43 Finally, the defense-ofmarriage argument proposes that "if sanctioned, [same-sex marriage]
will undermine the sanctity of 'traditional marriage' and lead to a

moral collapse."

44

a.The DefinitionalArgument
Perhaps the simplest of the secular purposes for banning samesex marriages is the definitional argument.14 5 Black's Law Dictionary
still defines marriage as "[t]he legal union of a couple as husband and
wife,"l 46 necessarily excluding the possibility of two men or two
women creating a marriage. In 1970, in Jones v. Hallahan,147
Kentucky's highest court considered various reference texts to
determine that "marriage has always been considered as the union of a
man and a woman and we have been presented with no authority to the
contrary."l 48 Although "[s]ame-sex unions have been recognized
throughout history ... in ancient Greece and Rome, Egypt, parts of
China, Japan, South East Asia, Australia, India, South America,
Medieval Eastern Europe, and practically everywhere else in the
world," 49 such was not the case in the United States until Goodridge
v. Dep 't of Public Health15 0 and the definitional argument provided a
simple, easy way out for reviewing judges.
While, prior to 2003, the "it is what it is" argument would have
made perfect sense to those unfamiliar with historical international
treatment of same-sex marriage,' 5 ' or those who based their support
solely on the historical treatment of same-sex marriage in the United
States up to that point, neither Black's definition, nor the definitional
141. Schuman, supra note 5, at 211 3 .
142. Id. (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Darren R. Spedale, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR
BETTER OR FOR WORSE? WHAT WE'VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 21-22 (Oxford, 2006)).

143. Id. (citing ESKRIDGE, supra note 142, at 25-26).
144. Id. (citing ESKRIDGE, supra note 142, at 28-29).
145. Id. at 2114.
146. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004), marriage.

147.
148.
149.
150.

501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
Id. at 589.
Schuman, supra note 5, at 2114.
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).

151.

See
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KEVIN
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argument are current or accurate. In the United States alone, five states
plus the District of Columbia recognize same-sex couples' rights to
marry.152 Outside the United States, there is even greater support for
same-sex marriage, as several Western European countries, Canada,
and South Africa all permit same-sex marriages.'5 "[G]iven the fact
that marriage is [now] defined more broadly across this nation and
throughout this world, 'that's just the way it is' carries less weight than
it used to," 1 54 and can no longer be considered a valid secular purpose
for banning same-sex marriage.
b. The Stamp-of-Approval Argument
The stamp-of-approval argument has become increasingly
popular with opponents of same-sex marriage.' 5 5 Such an argument
allows opponents of same-sex marriage to accept homosexuality for
the role it plays in society-in essence, abiding by an "I won't bother
you if you don't bother me" theory of human interaction156-but
prevents same-sex marriage from "transform[ing] the [historical]
institution of marriage by questioning traditional roles, rights and
duties based on gender."' ) A shining example of this phenomenon is
that opponents of same-sex marriage "routinely contend that the legal
recognition of gay and lesbian unions would be the first step down a
slippery slope that would ultimately foreclose legal prohibitions on
minors entering into marriage, polygamy, incest, and even
bestiality." 5 8 For opponents of same-sex marriage, this argument is
generally based on individual and collective senses of morality.15 9
Historically, homosexuality has been seen as immoral in the eyes of a
vocal majority;160 therefore a large segment of the American
population is unwilling to embrace a law that could promote its
acceptance. At least one Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court supports
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
Schuman, supra note 5, at 2114.
Id.
Id. at 2115.
Id.at2116.
Michael E. Solimine, Competitive Federalism and Interstate Recognition of

Marriage, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 83, 89-90 n.23 (1998).

158. Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1316
(2009).
159. Adam J. MacLeod, The Search for Moral Neutrality in Same-Sex Marriage
Decisions,23 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1, 59 (2008).
160. M. Blake Huffman, Out ofStep: Why Pulliam v. Smith Should be Overruledto Hold
All North Carolina Parents-Gay and Straight-to the Same Custody Standard, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 257, 284 n.190 (2008) (stating that over fifty-five percent of individuals interviewed in a
Gallup Poll in 2002 thought homosexuality was immoral).
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the stamp-of-approval argument. Justice Antonin Scalia, in a
dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,161 argued that the majority,
which, in that case, acknowledged a right to privacy and fostered a
certain tolerance for homosexuality that was absent from the Court's
previous decisions, had "signed on" to a "homosexual agenda ...
directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally
attached to homosexual conduct.",162 While the stamp-of-approval
argument has become increasingly popular with opponents of samesex marriage, it has also become perhaps the most vulnerable
argument to attack.
At the outset, the so-called valid secular justification for
banning same-sex marriage that is the stamp-of-approval argument is
not-so-secular after all. One's concept of morality is often shaped by
religious beliefs,163 and it is often the case that an individual's
condemnation for homosexuality stems directly from biblical text.164
An overwhelming percentage of individuals who consider themselves
religious oppose same-sex marriage, whereas there exists a split of
opinion among those who do not consider themselves religious.' 65
Such evidence suggests that the stamp-of-approval argument, with its
feet firmly rooted in concepts of morality, is based more in religion
than the constitution might allow.
The validity of the stamp-of-approval argument is also easily
called into question. "[W]hen a state recognizes same-sex marriages, it
purports to be[,] and actually is[,] supporting interpersonal
commitment (marriage), not homosexuality."' 6 Considering that the
stereotype that members of the gay community are promiscuous and
lack interpersonal commitment is one of the main reasons given when
opponents of same-sex marriage question the morality of
homosexuality,167 the logical assumption is that same-sex marriage
161. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
162. Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. See Justin R. Pasfield, Confronting America's Ambivalence Towards Same-Sex
Marriage:A Legal and Policy Perspective, 108 W.VA. L. REV. 267, 295 (2005).
164. Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality is not
Illegitimate in a Liberal Democracy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217, 225 (2001).
165. Jennifer Agiesta & Alec MacGillis, Poll: Rising US. Supportfor Social Issues, Such
as Gay Marriage, WASH. POST ( Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/04/30/AR2009043001640.html; see also Schuman, supra note 5, at
2108.
166. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Same-Sex MarriageDebate and Three Conceptions of
Equality, in MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE 167, 179 (Lynn D. Wardle et al.,
eds., 2003).
167. Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Equal ProtectionAnalogies-Identity and "Passing":Race
and Sexual Orientation, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 65, 92 (1997).
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would take a step towards promoting the morality of the gay
community. By way of analogy, "the governmental action of granting
a marriage license to a same-gender couple signals no more approval
of the act of gay sex or the group of gay couples, than the
governmental action of granting a marriage license to a convicted
rapist signals approval of the act of rape or the group of rapists." 68
The palpable difference is that the rapist can obtain a marriage license
in any state of this nation, so long as he or she is not attempting to
marry a person of the same sex.169
c. The Defense of MarriageArgument
The 'defense of marriage' argument is based on the
underlying premise that 'the great virtue of marriage is
the creation of an altruistic space, where adults sacrifice
their own self-interest in the service of mutual
commitment to one another and to children they raise
together.' The proponents of this argument maintain
that traditional marriage has declined because this ideal
has been sacrificed by liberalizations that treat marriage
as just another avenue for seeking self-fulfillment and
pleasure. The legal recognition of same-sex marriage
would allegedly render the liberal conception of
marriage victorious and constitute the roverbial straw
that broke traditional marriage's back.'
This argument presupposes that same-sex couples are unable or
unwilling to create relationships based on mutual commitment. Rather,
it is suggested, same-sex relationships are based on selfishness, selfcenteredness, and solidarity.' 7 ' This concept allegedly weakens or
168. CHAi R. FELDBLUM, The Limitations of Liberal Neutrality Arguments in Favour of
Same-Sex Marriage, in THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF

NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 55, 60 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenas

eds., 2001).
169. Barbara J. Cox, The Lesbian Wife: Same-Sex Marriageas an Expression of Radical
and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 155, 161 (1997) ("Convicted felons, divorced
parents who refuse to pay child support, delinquent taxpayers, fascists, and communists-all
receive marriage licenses from the state. The Supreme Court stands ready to discipline any
state that denies their citizens their right to marry, yet no one believes that the license
constitutes state approval of felony, default on support obligations, tax delinquency,
communism, or fascism.... Gay people constitute virtually the only group in America whose
members are not permitted to marry the partner they love").
170. Staszewski, supra note 158, at 1317-18.
171. Courtney Megan Cahill, The Genuine Article: A Subversive Economic Perspective
on the Law's ProcreationistVision ofMarriage,64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 393, 450 (2007).
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cheapens the traditional marriage model such that opponents of samesex marriage must prevent marriage equality.
The validity of the defense of marriage argument is
questionable. "[S]ame-sex couples can, and do[,] enter into
relationships that comport with the traditional ideal of marriage." 7 2
Since 2003, thousands of same-sex couples in the United States have
been married, 7 3 and thousands more have entered civil unions. 174
Same-sex couples buy houses, pay taxes, raise children, attend church,
volunteer in their communities, and do the various other "stuff' that
heterosexual married couples do. Moreover, the establishment of
same-sex unions in various states has led to an "increase [in] the
number of 'married' couples, as well as the number of children who
are raised by two parents who are married to one another[,]" 7 7 a fact
that researchers say benefits the child, regardless of the gender of that
child's parents.17 "[W]hile [such] research is undoubtedly in a
preliminary state, the defense of marriage argument ... appears ... to
Based on
amount to nothing more than unwarranted speculation.
this evidence, the question remains: "Defend marriage from what?" 78
B. Same-Sex MarriageBans Enhance Some Religions and Inhibit
Others in Violation of the Establishment Clause.
It is an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause
if a statute's primary effect advances or inhibits religion.' 7 9 The U.S.
Supreme Court has decreed that "the Establishment Clause bars a State
from passing 'laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer

172. Staszewski, supra note 158, at 1318.
173. As of 2006, 11,000 same-sex couples had married in Massachusetts, David Filipov,
5 years later, views shifi subtly on gay marriage, BOSToN GLOBE, Nov. 17, 2008,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2008/11/17/5-Years later-views-sh
ift subtlyongaymarriage/, and prior to the passage of Proposition 8, over 18,000 same-sex
couples were married in California. Bob Egelko, Anti-gay Marriage Group Steps Up for Prop.
8, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 11, 2008, at B-2. Presumably, with the institution of same-sex marriages
in Connecticut, Iowa, Washington D.C., Vermont and New Hampshire, those numbers will
grow exponentially.
174. As of 2003, over 2,500 civil unions had been performed in Vermont alone. Roderick
T. Chen & Alexandra K. Glazier, Can Same-Sex Partners Consent to Organ Donation?, 29
AM. J.L. & MED. 31, 33 n. 13 (2003).
175. Staszewski, supra note 158, at 1318-19.
176. Id. at 1319.
177. Id. at 1319-20.
178. Schuman, supra note 5, at 2119.
179. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 303 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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one religion over another."' 80 Therefore, if a state enacts a same-sex
marriage ban, it must do so without promoting the religious tenets of
certain faiths or diminishing the tenets of certain others. In regard to
same-sex marriage, the enhancement prong of the Lemon test has been
considered before. In Dean v. District of Columbia,'8 ' the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia found that "[n]o 'religion' is
advanced by a refusal [to recognize same-sex marriages], since said
refusal applies equally to same-sex applicants who are atheists,
agnostics, or believers, and no one is thereby coerced in the slightest to
alter his or her convictions." 82 The present day treatment of same-sex
marriage within the eyes of various religious faiths makes the
institution of a same-sex marriage ban an almost impossible task to
complete without directly violating this concept.
Notwithstanding the analysis expressed in Dean,183 under the
second prong of the Lemon test-considering the state of same-sex
marriage today and the landscape of religious sentiment towards samesex marriage-a same-sex marriage ban, in effect, both enhances and
inhibits various religions in violation of the Establishment Clause.
"[A] law banning gay marriage achieves two ends. First, such a law
favors, or 'advances,' those religions that do not condone same-sex
unions by siding with that particular viewpoint. At the same time,
religions that would gladly solemnize a same-sex marriage but for the
law are 'inhibited."" 8 4 While a large number of religious
denominations, such as some American Baptists, Roman Catholics,
and Evangelical Christian Churches, only recognize traditional
marriages between a man and a woman, a larger number of
denominations, such as some Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Quakers,
and Unitarian Universalists, are supportive of same-sex unions.' 85
Simply put, "religious beliefs regarding same-sex marriage are neither
static nor universally-held within a single faith system."l 86 The
180. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242 (1968) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)).
181. No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364 (D.C. Super. Ct., 1992), af'd 653 A.2d 307 (D.C.
1995).
182. Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the Establishment
Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 1, 51 n.217 (2002) (quoting Dean, No. 90-13892, 1992

WL 685364 (D.C. Super. Ct., 1992), aff'd 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995)).
183. No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364 (D.C. Super. Ct., 1992), aff'd 653 A.2d 307 (D.C.
1995).
184. Amelia A. Miller, Note, Letting Go of a National Religion: Why the State Should
Relinquish All Control Over Marriage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2185, 2211 (2005).
185. Wilson, supra note 80, at 584 (compiling a thorough list of religious denominations
with their corresponding views on same-sex marriage).
186. Id. at 583-84.
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analysis expressed in Dean18 7 fails to fully consider the issue; the
question is not whether individuals are coerced to change their
religious beliefs, but whether state action advances a certain set of
religious beliefs.' 8 8 By enacting a same-sex marriage ban to restrict the
behavior of its citizens, a state essentially imposes the religious views
of the majority "over what should be secular, contractual rights."' 89
Such a practice is exactly the type of behavior the First Amendment
aims to prevent.
C. Same-Sex MarriageBans Appear to Promote CertainAnti-Gay
Religious Beliefs and Therefore Run Afoul of Justice
O'Connor'sEndorsement Test.
Although Justice Sandra Day O'Connor no longer sits on the
Court, and the endorsement test she created to evaluate Establishment
Clause questions perhaps lies dormant in the annals of Supreme Court
history, an endorsement test analysis is nevertheless telling. Under the
test, if a reasonable observer would find a particular practice to be an
endorsement of religion, that practice violates the Establishment
Clause as "an impermissible enhancement of religion." 90
From the eye of the unbiased observer, the issue of same-sex
marriage is clearly affected by religious interference. On one hand,
most Americans believe that the Bible condemns homosexuality,' 9 1
whether they follow scripture or not. When the issue comes to debate,
the most vocal opponents of same-sex marriages are religious leaders
and churchgoers who consider homosexuality a sin. 2 Religious
organizations and churches are strong financial supporters of
traditional marriage initiatives.193 Protestors of same-sex marriage

187. No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364 (D.C. Super. Ct., 1992), aff'd 653 A.2d 307 (D.C.
1995).
188. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242 (1968) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)).
189. Miller, supra note 184, at 2211.
190. Schuman, supra note 5, 2132 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
191. Rubinstein, supra note 137, at 1616.
192. Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise of Loving: Reflections on the
"Loving Analogy"for Same-Sex Marriage,51 How. L.J. 117, 143 (2007).
193. Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, IIth-Hour Effort Saved Same-Sex Marriage Ban
On Cahfornia Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, at Al (discussing the $40 million
contribution from congregants of the Mormon Church in support of Proposition 8, which
banned same-sex marriages in California).
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often hold signs citing Biblical passages.1 94 On the other hand, lessreligious individuals support marriage equality.' 95 The young and
liberal generally support marriage equality, populations that are less
likely to embrace a specific religious tradition.196 From the outside
looking in, religion clearly controls the debate. Therefore, under
O'Connor's endorsement test, a same-sex marriage ban should be
invalid.
D. Religion's Impact on the Same-Sex MarriageDebate Fosters
Excessive Government Entanglement with Religion in Violation
of the FirstAmendment.
A statute is unconstitutional if it fosters an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' 9 7 For the purposes of a
constitutional analysis, "excessive entanglement" means "that the
institutions of church and state are more entangled than they need to be
in order for government to accomplish its otherwise legitimate
purposes in the program or policy at issue."l 98 If the purposes of
denying same-sex couples the right to marry are threefold-to preserve
the history and custom of marriage in the United States, to maintain
America's moral compass as it pertains to marriage, and to defend the
sanctity of the traditional marriage modell 99-then each must be
accomplished in a manner as least-restricted by religion as possible.
To determine whether same-sex marriage bans pass
constitutional muster, one must first consider that "the current state of
marriage is already an excessive entanglement with religion, given the
connection between the state and clergy in sanctioning a legal
marriage relationship." 200 When religion informs the moral scale
against which same-sex marriages are compared, 20 ' when religion
194. Susan J. Becker, Many are Chilled, But Few Are Frozen: How Transformative
Learning in PopularCulture, Christianity,and Science Will Lead to the Eventual Demise of
Legally Sanctioned DiscriminationAgainst Sexual Minorities in the United States, 14 AM. U.
J. GENDER Soc. Pot'Y & LAW 177, 219 (2006).
195. Schuman, supra note 5, at 2108.
196. Nicholas Bala, The Debates About Same-Sex Marriage in Canada and the United
States: Controversy over the Evolution ofa FundamentalSocial Institution, 20 BYU J. PUB. L.
195, 219 (2006).
197. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 303 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
198. Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection
Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 349-50
(1986).
199. See supra Part IV (A).
200. Schuman, supra note 5, at 2119.
201. See supra notes Part IV (A)(1)(b).
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dictates the confines of the traditional marriage model,2 02 when
religion fills the bank accounts of anti-marriage equality
organizations,20 3 and when religion creeps into legislative debate over
same-sex marriage,204 one must believe that religion has impermissibly
entangled itself farther than necessary into the law.
V. CONCLUSION
In 2006, the Maryland General Assembly debated the issue of
marriage equality. 205 At the time, only Massachusetts law permitted
same-sex marriage, and like a majority of states, Maryland law
provided that the only valid marriage was one between a man and a
woman.206 American University law professor Jamie Raskin testified
at a committee hearing in favor of marriage equality.207 During
Raskin's testimony, Senator Nancy Jacobs, a conservative Republican
representing rural Cecil and Harford Counties, stated: "As I read
Biblical principles, marriage was intended, ordained and started by
God-that is my belief . ..

For me, this is an issue solely based on

principals." 208

Without pause, Raskin replied: "Senator, when
religious
you took your oath of office, you placed your hand on the Bible and
swore to uphold the Constitution. You did not place your hand on the
Constitution and swear to uphold the Bible."20 9 The Raskin-Jacobs
exchange is a microcosm of the same-sex marriage issue. Despite
arguments to the contrary, religion has always been, and will always
be, a factor when considering marriage equality. Yet, when same-sex
marriage cases reach the appellate courts, religious arguments and
analyses are mysteriously absent.
The United States Constitution was created with a mind
towards separating Church and State, but on some social issues, such
as same-sex marriage, courts have turned a blind eye to the ideals of
our forefathers, allowing religious beliefs to color the law. The result,
based on arguments of morality, defense of traditional marriage, and
history-and all laden more with religious undertones than secular
reasoning-is that opponents of same-sex marriage have succeeded in
202.
203.
204.
205.

See supra notes Part IV (A)(1)(a).
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.
Kelly Brewington, Emotions flare over same-sex marriage, BALT. SUN, Mar. 2,

2006, at 5B.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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enacting laws that violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment and the rights of same-sex couples in this country. The
time for change has come, but until courts are willing to analyze
religion's impact on same-sex marriage, the ban plays on.

